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Tan Chung has never been a Clash of Civilisations in the Eastern Hemisphere thanks to the dominance of both India and China as well as their mutual interactions and vibrations through history.
Here, I wish to quote a Confucian adage: Qi yibian zhiyu Lu, Lu yibian zhiyu Dao (When evolution takes place, Qi will be transformed into Lu, Lu will be transformed into Tao) (Lunyu n.d.) . Qi and Lu were two different states within the pale of Chinese civilisation during Confucius time. To Confucius, Qi, which was strong, represented badao (the 'Lord's way', i.e., hegemony), while Lu, which pursued a policy of culture and morality, represented wangdao (the 'kingly way', i.e., moral leadership). But, Lu could still make progress towards a higher stage of Tao/Dharma or the prevalence of high moral principles and perfect peace and harmony. At the risk of oversimplification, we might conclude that Indian and Chinese civilisations had long completed the transformation from Qi to Lu, while the Western civilisations are yet to graduate from the stage of Qi, despite the positive move of the European Union towards totally abandoning hegemony.
In addition to this difference, ancient civilisations in the Western Hemisphere pursued a 'face-to-face' relationship with one another. Under the impact of hegemony, each civilisation wanted to stay 'on top of the world', striving to destroy its rival. In the Eastern Hemisphere, India and China never underwent such a course vis-à-vis each other. They pursued a 'back-to-back' relationship for two thousand years until the tripartite rivalry between British colonialism, Manchu imperialism and Czarist expansionism over the trans-Himalayan region during the nineteenth century.
Our book is an overview of this 'back-to-back' India-China civilisational dialogue which distinguished itself by three elements: (a) pilgrimage, (b) translation of Buddhist scriptures from Pali and Sanskrit into Chinese, and (c) trade and diplomacy. As Professor Geng has highlighted, the last element gained an upper hand and became outstanding only after the tenth century. In my contribution to the book, I focus mainly on the first two elements. However, I am consciously aware of the economic cooperation between ancient India and China which took place in a win-win spirit.
Civilisational dialogue must not be understood as merely cultural and spiritual idealism, there are always material and economic benefits as well. There was already a natural phytogeographical affinity (i.e., plants-like rice, tea, etc.) linking India and China, from the foot of the Himalaya and gradually spreading towards East and Southeast Asia. But it was the migration of Buddhism that structurally built up the phytogeographical affinity between India and China. I have examined, in Chapter Nine, 'Sino-Indic Ratna (5): Flying Dragons and Phoenixes', the Bencao Literature, China's famous Materia Medica-which has always been the reference-book of traditional Chinese medicine. This literature helps us to discover that in the rich botanical garden of China, plants like turmeric, nutmeg, asafoetida (hing in Hindi), cardamom, 'embolic leaf flower fruit' (amala/amalaki in Indian vernaculars), Indian rosemary, costus/banksian-rose, calabash, benzoin, levant storax, patchouli, etc. are all Indian gifts to China. This is in addition to other well-known Indian origins of cotton, black pepper, sandalwood, frankincense, clove, fig, jasmine, cape jasmine, pineapple, distribution.
sal, cucumber, sesame, brinjal, rapeseed, mustard, onion, amaranth, mango, spinach, etc. Though not a botanist, I have arrived at this conclusion after discovering the affinity between their Chinese and Indian names as enshrined in the Chinese Materia Medica. Buddhist monks played an important role in introducing these plants to Chinese soil.
China's whole-hearted reception of Buddhism from India is an undisputed historical fact. This reception was structurally built on three courses. The first course included the high level of admiration for Buddhism on the part of high intellectuals of ancient China. This led to the second course, viz. the majority of the imperial rulers of China, during the first millennium AD, seriously believed in the superiority of Indian civilisation, but wanted the intellectuals to provide material proofs. It was because of these two courses that a third unfolded with much enthusiasm and power, viz. Chinese Buddhists embarking on a pilgrimage to the Foguo (the countries of Buddha) in order to learn Buddhism and collect Buddhist scriptures. The Chinese imperial authorities, subsequently, organised an unprecedented trans-civilisational venture of translating as many Buddhist scriptures as possible into the Chinese language.
Let me first briefly illustrate the first two courses before dwelling on the third. Zong Bing (375-443) a high ranking courtier in Song Emperor Wen's court (reigning from 424-53) during the 'Southern and Northern Dynasties', composed an essay titled Ming Fo lun (Understanding Buddhism) in which he observed: 'The countries of Buddha are great, as there is immortality of spirit. People can become Buddha, and the xin/ heart can have versatile functions'. He further chided those Chinese intellectuals who had no faith in Buddhism for their 'inability to know the human heart, let alone the heart of Buddha' although they were 'conversant in classical teachings' of Chinese sages (Jun 1981: 228) . The Emperor, who was well known for three decades of merciful rule, took this view seriously. He also organised a well publicised debate in his court about the 'Middle Kingdom' (Zhongguo). Taking part in this debate was the famous courtier, He Chengtian (370-447) whose argument identifying China as Zhongguo was challenged by a Buddhist monk, Huiyan. The latter observed that during the Summer Solstice there was no shadow in India, while in China, people used the sundial to observe the shadow of the sun. Thus, the true Zhongguo was India, not China (Shijia fangzhi 1983: 7) . Nowadays, the 'Middle Kingdom' (Zhongguo) paradigm prevails in Chinese scholarship all over the world, equating Zhongguo with the Chinese superiority-complex. For a change, scholars might like to ponder upon this anecdote, which was just one of many instances, viz. to ancient Chinese Buddhists, it was India that was the 'Middle Kingdom' (Zhongguo), while China was actually the 'Eastern Land' (dongtu).
I anticipate the readers of our book developing an impression that it overwhelmingly gravitates towards the Indian influence on China without balancing it with details of a countervailing influence. Hence, not truly reflecting the bi-directional dynamics of civilisational intercourses. If this is true, I hope future researches can make amends. There are two factors, in my opinion, that could have created the impression of an imbalance. First, there was the Chinese diligence in preserving historical memory (to which Geng Yinzeng has alluded) on the one hand, and the Indian negligence distribution.
in this respect on the other. I might compare the Chinese endeavour to the creation of a computer memory of India-China civilisational dialogue. Our book has just downloaded some files of this memory. But, we are unable to open the files of Indian memory, which was largely burnt into ashes and thrown into the beds of holy rivers as per the tradition of cremation. Had India followed practices of burial, plenty of historical souvenirs would have been unearthed, like what has been going on in China for more than a century, especially in the last five decades. The second and more important aspect is that Chinese civilisation is far more integrated, and structurally more formatted than its Indian counterpart. India, being the thoroughfare between the Western and Eastern hemispheres, has been receiving far greater external influence than China for many millennia. As a result, the Indian civilisation has projected a totality of heterodox past and pluralist present, to quote the Indian Nobel laureate, Professor Amartya Sen.
1 In contrast, China has shown a persistent endeavour towards achieving homogeneity, orthodoxy and past-present mediation. If I may indulge in further imagery, Indian civilisation is a huge container that can accommodate virtually everything, while Chinese civilisation is a huge melting pot that transforms all different materials in it into a new compound. India is the 'Unity in Diversity' that projects more Diversity than Unity, China is the 'Unity in Diversity' that tends to replace Diversity with Unity. Let me elaborate a little more. In India, isolating Indianness from non-Indianness is virtually impossible; on the other hand, in the Chinese case, we can distinguish the external elements from the internal by reducing the cultural compound to its original components. This, in fact, is the methodology I have used in the book. It is this methodology that has led me to discover the 'Sino-Indic ratna/ jewel'.
I have devoted five chapters to highlighting the saliency of the 'Sino-Indic ratna'. In Chapter Five, 'Temple Culture', I have recognised the contribution of Buddhism in converting China into a country of temples, which is attracting ample domestic and international tourists today. There is a long-standing Chinese saying:
Shishang haoyan Fo shuojin, Tianxia mingshan seng zhanduo. 'All good words of mankind are said by the Buddha, Buddhist monks occupy most famous hills of China.'
Before the advent of Buddhism, China had virtually no religious institution only a 'palace culture', and not the 'temple culture' that India has been famous for from times immemorial (while Indian 'palace culture' can be traced back only till the Mughal Dynasty). Of course, the Chinese 'temple culture' has both similarities and dissimilarities with its Indian prototype. Both have absorbed immense social wealth to promote excellence in creating scenic architecture and art, and both have also opened their gates to commoners. In addition, Chinese Buddhist temples played a role in the translation of scriptures and the creation of printing and book industries.
The major difference lies in their names. While Indian temples have always been named after Gods most of the prominent Chinese Buddhist temples in history had been christened by the emperors, and had the word guo (state) in their identity-for instance, Anguosi (temple pacifying the state), Huguosi (temple protecting the state), Xingguosi (temple reinvigorating the state), Qingguosi (temple purifying the state), Daxiangguosi (temple administering the state), to name just a few. But this is not only a matter of names. Indian Buddhists knew that the concept of 'guo/state' was crucial to the Chinese civilisation, hence, they opted towards fortifying the state, instead of weakening it in China. Here, Buddhism has shown the extent it could go to help Chinese civilisation strengthen and prosper. We also see a unique paradigm of Indian civilisation helping its Chinese counterpart in the development of a secular polity.
In Chapter Six, 'Suvarna-cakra-Imperial Structure', I have cited the unique example of the renowned and powerful Tang Emperor Taizong (reigning from 626-49) as the only eminent personification of 'Suvarna-cakravartin-the universal ruler' of Indian Buddhist political idealism-among all rulers of the world. To some modern Chinese scholars who specialise in Confucianism, the Tang Dynasty (618-906)-the golden period of Chinese civilisation-was one of the dark ages because of the eclipse of Confucian values by Buddhism. We see the three greatest Tang rulers assuming the grandeur of Suvarna-cakravartin. Besides Emperor Taizong, the other two were: (a) reigning Empress Wu who had been consort, attendant, and daughterin-law of Emperor Taizong, and (b) Emperor Xuanzong I, grandson of Empress Wu. Empress Wu (reigning from 690-710) is the lone outstanding exception in Chinese political tradition-a female 'Son of Heaven'. Without the moral authority of Buddhism, such a development would not have been possible in male chauvinistic imperial China. She assumed a formidable title of Cishi yuegu jinlun shensheng huangdi (Sacred maitreya suvarna chakravartin emperor surpassing the ancients). Emperor Xuanzong I (reigning from 710-56) assumed the title of Kaiyuan tiandi dabao shengshen wenwu xiaode zhengdao huangdi (The Emperor who opens a new era of Heaven and Earth, is in possession of maharatna, distinguished in both scholarship and valour, pious and with filial piety, sacred and fulfilling the idealism of Tao)-the longest honorific title ever proclaimed by a reigning monarch in China, if not in world history. Though the wording of jinlun (suvarna-cakra) disappeared in this long title, it was replaced by dabao (maharatna/great jewel), another Buddhist term widely adopted by Chinese rulers to add glamour and power to the traditional concept of 'mandate of Heaven' (tianming), from the sixth century onwards. In the Chapter, I have dwelt on the benevolent influence of Buddhism on all rulers of the Tang Dynasty (except one), and on some of their successors from the later Song Dynasty (960-1276). One unique example is the several scores of 'deyin/benevolent-news' edicts issued by the Chinese emperors for four centuries from the first half of the eighth century. We see the Buddhist element of faith entering Chinese political ideology which had long been dominated by Confucian values.
In Chapter Seven, 'Vimalakirti Personalities', I have dealt with the pragmatic and utilitarian manner in which Chinese intellectuals absorbed the quintessential Indian distribution.
values without drastically affecting their way of life. This explains why of all Indian sages, they singled out Vimalakirti as the model for emulation. In Buddhist legends, Vimalakirti was even more enlightened than the famous Bodhisattvas (like Manjusri, who listened to Vimalakirti's sermon), and yet, he was a family man. Such a role model helped a section of Chinese intellectuals enjoy 'not-simple living and high thinking'. Here, I am reminded of Rabindranath Tagore's unique praise of Chinese culture when he said: 'can anything be more worthy of being cherished than the beautiful spirit of Chinese culture that has made the people love material things without turning them materialistic?' (Tan and Geng Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, in my opinion, are classic examples of the eclecticism and complexity of ancient Chinese minds that cut across narrow boundaries of the three 'isms' (Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism) set up by modern scholarship. Today, in the discourse on 'Confucianism', we see the literature centering around the theories of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming, proponents of the so-called 'NeoConfucianism', an English term that cannot be translated into Chinese. What Zhu Xi had championed was called lixue which, I think, should be identified as the 'yukti school'. What Wang Yangming had championed was called Xinxue which, I think, should be identified as the bodhicitta school. I should hasten to emphasise the influence of the Indian value of bodhicitta on Chinese minds for more than a thousand years, till today. I particularly recommend a chapter in a newly published book edited by my friend, Professor Yu Longyu of Shenzhen University. In this chapter, the young scholar of Shenzhen University, Feng Fei, has a refreshing discussion on the contribution of bodhicitta to patriotic, revolutionary and reformist thinking in modern China (Longyu et. al. 2004: 157-65) .
In Chapter Eight, I have adopted the comparative method that leads me to the analysis of the Indian origins of many Chinese concepts and literary expressions. For instance, the fondness for gold amongst Indians in their material life, has led to their coining several scores of different words for gold (like suvarna, hiranya, hema, kancana, agnivirya, lohottama, etc.) . In contrast, both in material life and in imagination, Chinese during the pre-Buddhist times were virtually strangers to gold. However, we see a spurt in the usage of jin (denoting 'metal', but adapted to connote 'gold') in the Tang literature and afterwards, obviously emulating the Sanskrit Buddhist literature using the 'gold' imagery to glorify preciousness. This widespread usage, interestingly, did not drive away the traditional Chinese symbol for preciousness, i.e., yu (jade), but created a new Chinese rage of four syllabic phrases combining the two symbols, jin and yu-the former being imported (from India) and the latter domestic. Here is a typical example of a win-win in civilisational dialogue. Another example I have dwelt upon is the semantic evolution of the Chinese word xiang which was originally not a nasal sensation. The frigid climate contributed to the ancient Chinese insensitivity to smell, so that there was no proper word for appreciating 'fragrance' until the advent of Buddhism. On the other hand, the sub tropical Indians' over sensitivity to odour and the exuberant growth of aromatic plants in India led to an indulgence in the gandha imagery in Sanskrit Buddhist literature. Of the multiple hyperbolist attributes for Buddha, one is 'gandha/fragrance'-equating 'fragrance' with holiness. Meanwhile, the export of perfumed substances and transplantation of aromatic plants from India to China, combined with the introduction of the Indian practise of incense-burning to the Chinese way of life, made it necessary for Chinese literature to not only designate 'fragrance' but also emphasise its importance. All this served to enrich the connotation of xiang-the belated Chinese equivalent for 'gandha/fragrance'. There were other such enriching effects of the India-China civilisational dialogue on Chinese literature.
For many decades, I have been conscious of my 'stranger-at-the-gate' appearance in historical studies in the mainstream social science discourse. Meanwhile, when I read scholarly writings by Chinese and Indian scholars, particularly the former, I find echoes of my thinking. There seems to me a Great Divide somewhere between myself and others pursuing 'social science-less' studies in history, and the lot of scholars in the mainstream social sciences pursuing 'culture-less' inquiries. There is no gainsaying the contempt of positivist scholarship on the part of modern historians, not excluding many Indians, for traditional Indian and Chinese wisdom, particularly when such wisdom is cited in historical studies. I consider myself quixotically brave in sticking to my propositions.
Doing this book with Geng Yinzeng has been a great education for me. I am more than ever convinced that in the back-to-back India-China civilisational dialogue there is paradigmic significance that cannot be over-stated. There are two synchronic aspects I wish to connect: one relating to the modern development of bilateral relations between India and China, another relating to the international situation in the world. In our survey of 'twenty centuries', Geng and I made a conscious decision to make the year 1949 the cut-off point to close the 'Chronology'. This does not mean that we are blind to the bilateral relations in the last several decades, during which the IndiaChina back-to-back relations were greatly disturbed. It seems to me that both India and China have fallen in line with the rest of the world in the pursuit of culture-less power and interest in the geo-political paradigm where the 'offensive realist', 'neoliberal institutionist' and 'defensive internationalist' theories dominate. By breaking with the past, the two countries have become obsessed with India-China rivalry, and by becoming modern rivals both have forgotten their shared heritage and the shared idealism of vasudhaiva-kutumbakam/tianxia-yijia (the world is one family). Only by reviving India-China civilisational dialogue can the two countries come out of this vicious circle.
There is even more cause for worry in the current international situation. Osama bin Laden and his followers have lent their powerful support to the theory of the 'Clash of Civilisations' that has put the leader of the post-Cold War world on the defensive. While the world has become interdependent through globalisation, the leading light of this globalisation is behaving like a 680 pound gorilla, trying to refashion world order unilaterally with scant regard for international legality. Such a development distribution.
